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 2 
Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the progress made in the process of European integration from 
two points of view: regulation and supervision. 
 
We first briefly outline the main steps in the development of the Financial Services Action Plan - 
FSAP and the process of Comitology, defined by the Committee of Wise Men (Lamfalussy 
Committee). 
 
We then provide an initial evaluation of the new regulatory system, with its merits and flaws: while 
the definition and completion of the FSAP has been an undoubted success, some aspects still 
have to be dealt with, several of them with problematical connotations , considered in the Financial 
Services Agenda 2005-2010 The transposition into national regulations of a complex body of wide-
ranging sta ndards is a difficult process in terms of both times and procedures, although the 
functioning of the Comitology structure has been met with general approval.  
 
There is also the problem of a supervisory structure which retains its national basis, but onto which 
the output generated by the Committees envisaged by the Lamfalussy process is gradually being 
grafted, possibly leading towards a new framework of controls at a European level. 
 
Key words: Single Financial Market, FSAP, Lamfalussy Report, Committee of Wise Men, 
Comitology, Regulation, Supervision, Eu directives, Financial Services Agenda 2005-2010.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Financial integration can be defined as a situation where there are no sources of friction 
discriminating between economic players with regard to accessing or investing capital, particularly 
as a result of their geographical origin1. 
 
The achievement of financial integration implies the removal of the obstacles preventing the use of 
network externalities and the economies of scale and scope available to participants in an 
expanded market; it also allows the development of common rules, practices and standards for all 
participants and service providers. 
 
The integration of financial services and markets is considered fundamental for the success of the 
European Union's economy, and a number of bodies of research have assessed the effects of 
financial integration. According to some theories, international financial integration facilitates the 
sharing of risk, increases specialisation, and improves the allocation of capital and economic 
growth2. Moreover, neo-classical theory maintains that international financial integration facilitates 
the flow of capital -poor economies, with positive effects.  According to Levine3, another effect is the 
improvement of the efficiency of the domestic financial system, through the intensification of 
competition and the importation of more up-to-date financial services. 
 
However, where distortions are already present, financial integration may retard growth.  Boyd and 
Smith4 show that in states with weak institutions and an inefficient policy line, which generates an 
unreliable legal system, integration may trigger an outflow of capital from these economies towards 
economies with better developed, more efficient financial systems. 
 
In short, many benefits are forecast from European financial integration, for both investors and 
companies.  Investors should benefit from an improvement in risk-adjusted earnings, thanks to the 
expanded opportunities for portfolio diversification and more liquid, competitive capital markets.  In 
fact, increased competition amongst financial intermediaries offers firms a wider range of financial 
products, on more advantageous terms.  A larger economic context improves the allocation of 
financial resources to support investment projects, with a positive impact on the level of equilibrium 
of the GDP, and potentially also on GDP growth rates.  
 
During the last few years, Europe has been the stage for an ambitious action plan on the subject of 
financial regulation, the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), launched in 1999 to facilitate the 
construction of the single market in financial services within the European Union.  The FSAP has 
been accompanied by the Lamfalussy process, which modifies the entire procedure for the 
approval of European legislation, with the intervention of regulatory and supervisory committees in 
specific phases, in a mechanism known as Comitology.  
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the evolution of financial regulation within the European Union, 
as it emerges from the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), the working of the Committee-
based approach recommended by the Lamfalussy Committee's Report, and the implications for a 
supervisory function at the EU level.  
 
                                                     
1
 See  ECB, 2003, THE INTEGRATION OF EUROPE’S FINANCIAL MARKETS , MONTHLY BULLETIN, OCTOBER. 
2
 See. OBSTFELD M., 1994,  RISK-TAKING, GLOBAL DIVERSIFICATION, AND GROWTH, A MERICAN ECONO MIC REVIEW; ACEMOGLU, 
D., F. ZILIBOTTI, 1997, WAS PROMETHEUS UNBOUND BY CHANCE? RISK DIVERSIFICATION, AND GROWTH, JOURNAL OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY . 
3
 See  LEVINE R., 2001, “INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH,” REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC, 9, 688-702. 
4
 See  BOYD J.H., SMITH B.D., 1992, INTERMEDIATION AND THE  EQUILIBRIUM ALLOCATION OF INVESTMENT CAPITAL: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS. 
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To achieve this, first and foremost, after briefly outlining the aims and structures of the FSAP, we 
assess the work done so far and provide hypothesis concerning the development of the regulatory 
framework during the coming years, known as the Post-FSAP period: Financial Services Agenda 
2005-2010. 
  
In the next section, after running through the characteristics of the Comitology approach, we 
analyse the state of the art in the application of Comitology to the regulatory system of the FSAP, 
concentrating on the main securities sector Directives affected by this process: at this stage, the 
Market Abuse Directive (2003/6/EC) and its three technical implementing Directives (2003/124/EC, 
2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC) and the Prospectus Directive (2003/71/EC). In future, it will also 
cover the Market in Financial Instruments Directive (“MiFID”, 2004/39/EC) and the Transparency 
Directive (2004/109/EC) as well as their implementing measures 5. 
 
To conclude, we provide brief comments about the possible evolution of the regulatory framework 
and of the supervisory architectures in Europe, on the basis of an initial assessment of the work 
done by the Committees, and the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) in 
particular. At one extreme there is the maximum level of uniformity, to be achieved through the 
creation, at the Community level, of a single authority or even a number of authorities competent 
for the various sectors of the financial services industry; at the other extreme, at least greater co-
ordination will be necessary between the national supervisory authorities, especially with regard to 
intermediaries active at the cross-border level. Between the various extremes there are a number 
of options, envisaging a growth in the importance of the Committees.  
 
2 Post-Fsap  
 
The Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), presented by the Commission in 1999, identifies a 
series of measures considered necessary to complete the European single financial market; it 
comprises 42 measures of different kinds (Directives, Regulatio ns and Recommendations) which 
refer to the various sectors of the financial services market: securities, banking, insurance, UCITS 
(Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities) and pension funds. 
 
All the Plan's legislative measures are based on the principles of minimal harmonisation, mutual 
recognition and home country control, adopting the usual methods for dividing regulatory 
competencies between European Institutions and member States.  
 
The FSAP is a key document in the political process for the construction of a common regulatory 
framework for the European Union's financial markets, as reference framework for the new policy 
initiatives relating to the regulation of European capital markets and firms6, to be implemented 
before the end of 2005. This document, launched as already stated in 1999, was also drawn up 
with a view to the subsequent enlargement of the European Union, which took place in 2004. 
  
Its contents and those of its accompanying reports also embrace topics such as fiscal, monetary 
and competition policy, giving it the connotations of a genuine system -wide document, setting itself 
clear strategic objectives with regard to: 
1) a single wholesale capital market; 
2) open, secure retail markets; 
3) prudential and supervis ory rules; 
4) general objectives relating to a miscellaneous set of conditions necessary for the 
achievement of a single financial market7. 
 
                                                     
5 http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/857&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=fr 
6
 See  THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2004, FINANCIAL SERVICES, TENTH PROGRESS REPORT, JUNE. 
7
 See  EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 1999, FINANCIAL SERVICES: IMPLEMENTING THE FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS : ACTION 
PLAN, COM(1999)232, 11TH MAY. 
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The FSAP's innovative scope is due to the fact that it is a plan structured in relation to objectives to 
be pursued through the adoption of actions featuring a scale of priorities and the compliance with a 
specific set of deadlines: 
1 – actions which have received broad consent; 
2 – actions which adapt existing legislation or structures to the evolutions that have taken place on 
the financial markets; 
3 - actions on topics on which debate is in progress. 
 
As of today, 39 of the 42 measures envisaged have been launched, with an undoubted 
improvement in the regulation of the financial sector. The three missing measures are two in the 
area of Corporate Governance (10 th Corporate Directive on cross-border merger operations; 14th 
Directive on transfers abroad) and one more, the most significant, concerning the adoption of a 
proposal for new capital adequacy measures for banks  and investment companies (Basel 2):  
Capital Adequacy Directive, CAD 3. 
 
However, the effects of the new regulations will only become apparent with time: many measures 
have only recently been adopted and have not yet been implemented in the various states .  
Therefore, while on the one had the FSAP's regulations have still to bed themselves into national 
regulatory frameworks, on the other it is useful to assess the efficacy and speed with which the 
European regulatory process is being completed. Obviously,  these two aspects are intrinsically 
inter-connected.  
 
We have now entered the period known as Post-FSAP, covered by the regulatory agenda for  
2005-20108.The FSAP process was concluded at the start of the new European legislature. There 
is unanimous agreement on the decisive importance of the FSAP's contribution to the emergence 
of an all-inclusive legislative plan, aimed at the completion of the single market in financial 
services. 
 
Most people accept that further legislation is not feasible, except mayb e in a few areas, until the 
FSAP itself has first been "digested", i.e. until the regulations have been implemented in the 
various national contexts, with a clearer, more efficient division of labour between the various 
levels of the Lamfalussy process, giving market forces the opportunity to work with the new rules, 
put them to the test and develop responses to the obstacles to integration9. There is, in fact, a 
general awareness that, in the words of the Commissioner for the Internal Market Charlie 
McCreevy : “Sequels to even the best originals tend to exhaust people’s enthusiasm, so there will 
be no FSAP 2”10.  
 
In this area, in May 2005, the European Commission produced a “Green Paper on Financial 
Services Policy (2005-2010) setting out the policy objecti ves in the field of financial services for the 
next five years. After consultation with market participants , which revealed broad support for these 
political priorities, a White Paper on Financial Services Policy (2005-2010) was issued in 
December 200511. These documents recall the progress made towards an integrated financial 
market in Europe during 1999-2005, with the drafting of the FSAP, with regard to the legislative 
framework, and with the introduction of the Lamfalussy process with reference to the rationalisation 
of the decision-making process and regulatory structure. 
 
For the future, the leitmotive of the Commission’s approach is defined as “dynamic consolidation” 
and the focus of financial services policy priorities is  placed on four main objectives: consolidating 
progress, completing unfinished business, enhancing supervisory cooperation and convergence 
                                                     
8 See THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP – KOK GROUP, 2004, FACING THE CHALLENGE , THE LISBON STRATEGY  FOR GROWTH AND 
EMPLOYMENT.  
9
 AMONGST OTHERS, SEE: SPAVENTA L. , BREUER ROLF-E., GREEN PAPER, FREIAAS ET AL.. 
10 See: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/527&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en ... 
11
 See  EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2005 GREEN PAPER ON FINANCIAL SERVICES POLICY (2005-2010),  BRUSSELS, JUNE.; WHITE  
PAPER ON FINANCIAL SERVICES POLICY (2005-2010),  BRUSSELS, DECEMBER;  
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and removing the remaining economically significant barriers12: The Commission will work with 
Member States to monitor progress, ensure accurate implementation and avoid regulatory 
addition, so-called “goldplating”. 
 
Many of the key elements of the White Paper are of a practical nature and the Commission 
commits itself to a “Better Regulation” approach, by deploying the most open, transparent, 
evidence-based method of policy making, based on:   
1- open consultation, including stakeholder groups, on any legislative proposal 
2- impact assessments, in order to determine the most appropriate option, focusing on a costs and 
benefits analysis  of any new Commission proposal 
 
The various players in the process (European Commission, Member States, regulatory bodies and 
market participants) are required to contribute to the objectives set by the White Paper: Annex 1 
presents an overview of the concrete tasks assigned. 
 
The priorities identified within the 2005-2010 agenda pick up on some of the aspects found to be 
critical in the recent past: the use of consultation mechanisms at all levels with the aim of achieving 
a transparent decision-making process; simplification of financial regulations at both the European 
and national level; convergence of supervisory standards and practices (to be discussed in greater 
detail below) in compliance with the current institutional structure and political areas of jurisdiction; 
activities in cooperation with the Member States to improve the transposition of regulations, with 
coherent implementation; evaluation of the ability of the existing regulations to deliver the expected 
economic benefits , so called “impact assessment”, with the possibility of reviewing the ones which 
do not pass the test; and reinforcement of measures in case of violation proceedings. For an 
immediate overview of the Directives' transposition status, see table 1. 
                                                     
12See  EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2005, WHITE PAPER ON FINANCIAL SERVICES POLICY (2005-2010). SEE ALSO ANNEX I, ANNEX II 
AND ANNEX III TO THE WHITE PAPER, BRUSSELS, DECEMBER; 
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TABLE 1: Transposition of FSAP Directives (State of Play 15/03/2006). 
 
 Transposition deadline Done On going 
Partially notified/  
no notification 
received  
Directive on E-Money Institutions 27 April 2002 25   
Directive amending the Insurance Directives and the 
ISD to permit information exchange with third 
countries 
17 November 2002 25   
Directive on the reorganisation and winding -up of 
banks 
05 May 2004 21 1 3 
Directive on the reorganisation and winding -up  
insurance undertakings 
20 April 2003 25   
Directive amending the 4th and 7th Company Law 
Directives to allow fair value accounting  
01 January 2004 17 6 2 
Directive supplementing the Statute for a European 
Company with regard to the envolvement of 
employees 
10 October 2004 12 8 5 
Directive amending the Money Laundering Directive 15 June 2003 23 1 1 
Directive on Insurance Mediation 15 January 2005 18 1 6 
Directive on Conglomerate 11 August 2004 19 1 5 
Directive on Market Abuse 12 October 2004 12 9 4 
Directive on the taxation of savings income in the form 
of interest payments 
01 January 2004 25  0 
Modernisation of the accounting provisions of the 4th 
and 7th Company Law Directives 
01 January 2005 16 5 4 
Prospectus Directive 01 July 2005 0 21 4 
Two directives on UCITS (D 2001/107/EC - D 
2001/108/EC) 13 August 2003 25   
Directive on the prudential supervision of pension 
funds 
23 September 2005 12  13 
Two directives amending the solvency requirements in 
the Insurance Directives (D 2002/83/EC - D 2002/13/EC) 20 September 2003 25   
Directive on financial collateral arrangements 17 December 2003 24 1  
Directive on the distance marketing of Financial 
Services 
09 October 2004 20 0 5 
Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments (update 
of ISD) 
30 April 2006 0 0 25 
Directive on Take-Over Bids 20 May 2006 0 0 25 
Transparency Directive 20 January 2007 0 0 25 
Legend: in yellow the Directives for which the transposition deadline already passed  
Source: our elaboration on European Commission, Internal Market, Financial Services, Action Plan 
 
The agenda also identifies specific areas on which the Commission is to concentrate its attention. 
First and foremost, the process of consolidation of cross -border financial operators, the level of 
which, as revealed by assessments of the integration process's progress, is disappointingly low. 
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Secondly, special attention will be focused on the level of application of European regulations by 
the new Member States. 
 
Finally, with regard to forthcoming measures in the financial services area, a Green Paper on 
Asset Management was published in July 2005 on the existing legislation governing UCITS, 
currently managing over 5 trillion euro of assets,  and the problem of transposing it correctly, with 
an evaluation of the existing system's adequacy for the protection of retail investors, also 
considering the profound structural changes in the asset management industry13. A White Paper is 
due by the second half of 2006, aiming at improving the single market framework and eliminating 
hitches in the functioning of the UCITS passport.14   
 
Another topic on the 2005-2010 agenda to receive top priority concerns the sector assessed as 
least integrated: retail financial services15. While the FSAP focused mainly on the wholesale 
market, retail integration is to be fostered from now on. In this area, the Commission intends to 
draw up a limited number of actions aimed at eliminating the most significant cross -border barriers 
and risks for consumers : 
Payments area:  the proposal for a Payments Services Directive was adopted by the 
Commission on the 1st December 2005, aiming at the creation, by 2010, of a Single European 
Payment Area (SEPA) with payments as easy and convenient throughout the Eurozone as they 
are domestically today; 
Consumer credit: with the aim of creating a true internal market for consumer credit and 
improving consumer protection, a modified proposal for a Directive was published on 10 th October 
2005; 
Mortgage credit: necessary, economically justified measures for the integration of the EU 
market will be announced by a White Paper in 2006. 
 
3 The Comitology Process 
 
While on the one hand the FSAP has the undoubted merit of having completed the preparation of 
the regulatory framework necessary for the effective exercise of freedom of establishment and to 
provide services within the European Union16, on the other, although it was produced with a clearly 
defined set of aims and priorities, by its very nature it could not and cannot bring about the financial 
single market in itself.  In order to achieve this aim, attention was simultaneously focused on the 
decision-making and procedural process for European regulations. 
 
With this in mind, and with specific reference to the securities sector, on 17 July 2000 the EU 
Economic and Finance Ministers created a Committee of independent experts, known as the Wise 
Men Committee, chaired by Baron Alexander Lamfalussy, with the task of assisting the European 
Commission, with three main objectives17: 
?  to asses the conditions for implementation of the regulation of the securities markets in the 
European Union; 
                                                     
13
 FOR A CRITICAL ANALYS IS OF THIS TOPIC SEE V.VENTURELLI, 2005, , Profili Regolamentari del Comparto dell'Asset 
Management, in G. N. Mazzocco (Editor) Asset management: prospettive di convergenza tra banche e assicurazioni. 
Profili regolamentari e gestionali , Giappichelli, Torino   
 
14 See McCreevy 2005, Recent Developments in The Internal Market for Financial Services and Financial Reporting; 
2006, The next steps to financial Europe  
15 See: EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2005, WHITE PAPER ON FINANCIAL SERVICES POLICY (2005-2010). SEE ALSO McCreevy 2005, 
Recent Developments in The Internal Market for Financial Services and Financial Reporting; 2006, The next steps to 
financial Europe; 2006 Financial Market Integration 
16
 SEE ECB, 2004,  MONTHLY BULLETIN, NOVEMBER. 
17
 See  COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN, 2000, THE INITIAL REPORT ON THE REGULATION OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS ,  
BRUSSELS, NOVEMBER. 
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?  to assess how the mechanism for regulating the securities markets in the EU can best 
respond to the changes underway on these markets, while still guaranteeing their effective 
and dynamic operation, to achieve a regulatory level playing field; 
?  to eliminate barriers and obstacles by proposing scenarios for the adaptation of current 
practices in order to ensure greater convergence and cooperation in day-to-day 
implementation, taking new developments in the market into account. 
 
The report18 of the Wise Men Committee, or Lamfalussy Committee, approved the FSAP 
approach, but nevertheless highlighted the risk that the measures it contained might not be 
implemented with the necessary speed and to the necessary standards.  In order to benefit from 
an integrated capital market, it is essential to have a regulatory system with clear, well -defined 
objectives, which operates more efficiently and is flexible enough to adapt to the continuous, rapid, 
deep-seated changes involving the operators, products and financial markets. 
The analysis conducted by the Wis e Men Committee revealed that the regulatory system failed to 
meet these requirements. Level by level, it found that: 
 
?  at the level of primary regulations, the process for the adoption of Directives was often too 
slow. Even when political problems did not arise, it took three years on average to agree a 
Directive or a Regulation.  Such a time-scale was unacceptable when legislation was meant 
to bring an appropriate response to a fast-changing world; 
?  the search for a political consensus sometimes led to the adoption of ambiguous texts or 
texts with levels of harmonisation so low that no real integration was achieved; 
?  too many delays were occurring in the implementation of legislation by individual Member 
States.19 
 
The solution proposed by the Wise Men Committee to solve these problems was the adoption of a 
different approach to regulatory and supervisory procedures, on four levels, all involving the 
European Commission, but backed up by different bodies in each context (figure 1).  The 
Comitology structure, in itially proposed for the securities industry and subsequently extended to 
the other financial sectors, is based on different types of Committee: Regulatory and Supervisory, 
with different tasks in the various levels.  The Regulatory Committees assist the C ommission in its 
regulatory function, with the aim of streamlining legislative procedures and making them more 
efficient.  The Supervisory Committees provide the Commission with technical advice with regard 
to second level legislation, with reference to the contents of implementation measures.  
 
In the first place, the structure proposed recognises two levels in the legislation for the regulation of 
financial markets, with legislative powers balanced and attributed to different bodies: 
 
?  Level 1: basic political choices relating to principles that can be translated into broad but 
sufficiently precise framework norms; within a politically negotiated joint decision-making 
process, these choices are made by the European Council and Parliament, acting on the 
recommendations of the Commission20. 
                                                     
18
 See  COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN, 2001, THE FINAL REPORT ON THE REGULATION OF EUROPEA N SECURITIES MARKETS ,  
BRUSSELS, FEBRUARY. 
19
 THE PROBLEM OF THE TRANSPOSITION SPEED OF DIRECTIVES IS CONSTANTLY MONITORED.  THE TRANSPOSITION DEFICIT SHOWS 
THE PERCENTAGE OF DIRECTIVES FOR WHICH NOTIFICATION OF TRANSPOSITION HAS NOT BEEN RECEIVED, COMPARED TO THE TOTAL 
DIRECTIVES ISSUED FOR WHICH THE DEADLINES HAVE PASSED. ACCORDING TO THE LATEST STATISTICS AVAILABLE, THE 
TRANSPOSITION DEFICIT CONCERNING ALL DIRECTIVES ON THE INT ERNAL MARKET HAS WORSENED SIGNIFICANTLY  AND AVERAGES 
3.6%.  THIS FIGURE IS WELL AWAY FROM THE INTERMEDIATE TARGET OF 1.5% AND THE REAL TARGET OF 0%.  FOR FURTHER 
DETAILS SEE COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC 
AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS – SECOND IMPLEMENTATION REPORT OF THE INTERNAL MARKET 
STRATEGY 2003-2006. BRUSSELS, 27.01.2005. 
20
 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TREATY OF A MSTERDAM, THE SIMPLIFIED JOINT DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURE SHARES DECISION -
MAKING POWERS EVENLY BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL.  AN ACT OF LAW IS APPROVED IF IT  RECEIVES 
THE CONSENT OF THE COUNCIL AND THE PARLIAMENT AT ITS FIRST READING.  IF THESE TWO INSTITUT IONS ARE IN DISAGREE MENT , A 
"CONCILIATION COMMITTEE" CONSISTING OF AN EQUAL NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF THE PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL MEETS, WITH 
THE COMMISSION PRESENT , TO AGREE A COMPROMI SE TEXT WHICH THE COUNCIL AND THE PARLIAMENT CAN SUBSEQUENTLY 
APPROVE. I F THIS MECHANISM FAI LS TO GENERATE AN AGREEMENT , THE PARLIAMENT CAN REJECT  THE PROPOSAL COMPLETELY WITH 
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?  Level 2: more detailed technical measures (second level legislation), which make the 
achievement of the objectives pursued by the legislation possible, in full conformity with the 
framework principles defined in level 2. The Commission is required to use the technical advice 
of the competent Supervisory Committee, working on the mandate of the Commission itself, 
which also consults market participants. This is followed by the qualified majority vote of the 
Member States represented on the competent Regulatory Committee. The European 
Parliament must be kept constantly informed and may issue a resolution if the intended 
measures are in excess of the powers delegated to the Committee; once the final text has 
been drafted, the Parliament has one month to check that the powers defined in level 1 have 
not been exceeded21. 
 
Subsequently, the Lamfalussy Committee proposes two additional levels: 
 
?  Level 3: based on the input of the competent Supervisory Committees, it has the task of  
ensuring the uniform, coherent transposition of first and second level legislation into 
national law.  These Committees, consisting of representatives of the national supervisory 
bodies, draw up guidelines and best practices for the administrative regulations to be 
adopted at the national level, as well as issuing joint interpretative recommendations, even 
on matters not covered by specific EU legislation.  This modus operandi aims to assure a 
very high degree of supervisory and regulatory convergence among Member States. 
 
?  Level 4: aims at strengthening the Commission's control over the application of EU 
legislation. If necessary, the Commission brings legal proceedings against defaulting 
Member States before the Court of Justice. 
 
 
The Committees' current structure (Figure 1) is the outcome of a number of measures. Initially, in 
fulfilment of its mandate, which focused on the securities industry, the Wise Men Committee 
planned to introduce two Committees, one Regulatory, the European Securities Committee (ESC) 
and the other Supervisory, the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR). 
 
In view of the success of the ESC and the CESR, in November 2003 the Commission decided to 
extend the Comitology approach to the other sectors of the financial services in dustry. In fact, the 
foundations for this extension had already been laid by the Report of the Wise Men Committee, 
which had the undoubted merit of reaching beyond its mandate, covering the securities markets, 
and making a general analysis of factors hinde ring the achievement of the single market, which 
affected the various sectors of the financial services industry in different ways and to different 
extents. These aspects included fragmentation, high transaction costs, regulatory differences and 
consumer safeguards, as well as problems relating to regulation and supervision. 
 
Reinforcing this approach, in 2000 the Brouwer I Report22 had highlighted the need to act to 
improve supervision at the European level, in particular by reinforcing cooperation with reg ard to 
large financial groups, improving the exchange of information between the various supervisory 
authorities and with central banks, and working on the convergence of supervisory practices. In 
2001, the Brouwer II Report23, on crisis management, confirm ed the need for closer cooperation 
between national supervisory authorities in order to prevent and properly manage systemic crises. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
AN ABSOLUTE MAJORITY. THE JOINT DECISION -MAKING PROCESS STRENGTHENS THE ROLE OF THE PARLIAMENT SINCE IT BECOMES A 
JOINT LEGISLATOR, AND IS APPLIED TO A WIDE RANGE OF TOPICS.  
21
 See  COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN, 2001, FINAL REPORT ON THE REGULATION OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKE TS. BRUSSELS,  
FEBRUARY, PAGE 36. 
22
 See ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL COMMITTEE, 2000, SOUND EU SUPERVISORY STRUCTURES AND PRACTICES (“BROUWER I 
REPORT”),  JANUARY. 
23
 See  ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL COMMITTEE, 2001, REPORT ON FINANCIAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT (“BROUWER II REP ORT”), APRIL. 
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The Comitology structure was expanded in 2003 with the issue of a draft Directive 24 proposing the 
creation, at levels 2 and 3, of sectorial committees competent for the various sectors of financial 
intermediation.  The new regulatory Committees are: the European Banking Committee (EBC) for 
the banking sector, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee  (EIOPC) for 
the insurance industry and pension funds and the European Financial Conglomerates Committee 
(EFCC) for financial conglomerates25. Like the European Securities Committee  for the securities 
sector before them, their task is to assist the Commission in adop ting the implementing measures 
for their respective sectors: banking, insurance and pension funds, and financial conglomerates.  
 
In the area of Supervisory Committees, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) 
and the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS) 
have been established alongside the CESR. 
 
Figure 1: The Lamfalussy process: the four -level regulatory structure  
                                                     
24
 See COM(2003) 659  DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE  COUNCIL AMENDING COUNCIL DIRECTIVES 
73/239/EEC, 85/611/EEC,  91/675/EEC,  93/6/EEC AND 94/19/EC AND DIRECTIVES 2000/12/EC, 2002/83/EC AND 
2002/87/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL, IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH A NEW FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMITTEE 
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE, 5 NOVEMBER 2003. 
25
 See  COMMISSION DECISION 2004/5/EC OF 5.11.2003  ESTABLISHING THE COMMITTEE OF EUROPEAN BANKING SUPERVISORS,  
COMMISSION DECISION 2004/6/EC OF 5.11.2003 ESTABLISHING THE COMMITTEE OF EUROPEAN INSURANCE AND OCCUPATIONAL 
PENSIONS SUPERVISORS, COMMISSION DECISION 2004/7/EC OF 5.11.2003  ESTABLISHING THE COMMITTEE OF EUROPEAN 
SECURITIES REGULATORS, COMMISSION DECISION 2004/8/EC OF 5.11.2003 ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN SECURITIES 
COMMITTEE , COMMISSION DECISION 2004/9/EC OF 5.11.2003  ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN INSURANCE AND OCCUPATIONAL 
PENSIONS COMMITTEE, COMMISSION DECISION 2004/10/EC OF 5.11.2003 ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN BANKING COMMITTEE. 
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Competence in relation to UCITS has been assigned to the ESC and the CESR26.  
 
In practice, the new procedural structure is grafted onto an existing process, known as Comitology, 
already in use at the EU level, which is thus reinforced at the institutional level, giving it greater 
visibility  
 
4 The State of the Art in Comitology 
 
An initial evaluation of the new regulatory structure can be derived from the analysis of the 
procedure followed for four new Directives relating to the securities sector, the first sector to be 
subjected to the effects of Comitology, as we have seen, on the recommendations of the 
Lamfalussy group.  These cover Market Abuse, Prospectuses, the Market in Financial Instruments 
and Transparency. 
 
The work done is clearly set out in the Third Report of the Inter-Institutional Monitoring Group 
(established in 2003 and consisting of a group of independent experts, with the task of assessing 
the progress made in application of the Lamfalussy method) and the CESR reports.27  Market 
participants have used these documents as the basis for their comments and criticisms28.  As 
things now stand, an effective analysis can be performed on the first two levels and some 
comments can be provided on the third level, but for the fourth level no useful evaluation can be 
made until the relative regulations have been incorporated into nati onal legislation and start to 
have their first effects. 
 
4.1 Levels 1 and 2 
 
The results of the analysis, which are however only partial, are contrasting and reveal that the 
approach adopted has brought both benefits and drawbacks. 
 
The most interesting aspects concern an examination of the speeding -up of the legislative process, 
the efficacy of the work done and the precision with which tasks were split between the first two 
levels. 
 
With regard to the first aspects, the time which passed between the presentation of the drafts of 
the first three Directives and their approval (policy agreement for the fourth), i.e. level 1, averaged 
16.5 months (Table 2)29. Level 2 has only been completed for the Market Abuse and Prospectus 
Directives, for which the time granted for technical and detailed aspects was 18 months.  The 
legislative procedure for these two Directives (from presentation of the draft proposal to the date 
set for implementation in national legislation) was 41 and 35 months respectively.  A comparison 
with the times taken in the past between presentation of the draft and publication in the EU Official 
Gazette points to a substantial improvement: 4.5 years for the Investment Services Directive in 
1993, and 9 years for a previous Prospectus Directive in 1989, while other Directives did manage 
to pass all the hurdles more quickly: 2.5 years for the Insider Dealing Directive in 1989, 3 years for 
the Interim Reports Directive which opened the way to the Transparency directive, and finally 3.5 
years for the UCITS Directive in 2002.  The signs of an acceleration in the legislative procedures, 
which are still not completely satisfactory, can be attributed to a number of factors: the deadlines 
                                                     
26 Venturelli V.,2005, Profili Regolamentari del Comparto dell'Asset Management, in G. N. Mazzocco (Editor) Asset 
management: prospettive di convergenza tra banche e assicurazioni. Profili regolamentari e gest ionali , Giappichelli, 
Torino   
27
 See INTER-INSTITUTIONAL MONITORING GROUP, 2004,  THIRD REPORT MONITORING THE LAMFALUSSY PROCESS, BRUSSELS, 17 
NOVEMBER; THE COMMITTEE OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES REGULATORS, 2004, THE ROLE OF CESR AT “LEVEL 3” UNDER THE 
LAMFALUSSY PROCESS, ACTION PLAN FOR 2005, PARIS, OCTOBER. 
28 See: http://www.cesr-eu.org/ 
29
 See. INTER-INSTITUTIONAL MONITORING GROUP, 2004, THIRD REPORT MONITORING THE LAMFALUSSY PROCESS,  BRUSSELS,   
NOVEMBER. 
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set by the FSAP, the use of systematic consultation mechanisms, and the application of the 
approach by levels which concentrates the key principles in level 1.  
  
Even if the results for the first two levels can be considered partially satisfactory, extremely 
discouraging signs are emerging from the only case in which level 3 sho uld have been concluded: 
there has been a complete failure to meet the schedule for implementation of the Market Abuse 
Directive (Directive on insider dealing and market manipulation - 2003/03/EC), which none of the 
25 states had adopted by the date of 12 October 200430. As of July 2005 sixteen countries had 
given notification of its implementation (seven already checked by the Commission), two had given 
partial notification, while seven had given no notification at all . As of March 2006, twenty-one 
countries had given notification of its implementation (twelve already checked by the Commission), 
two had given partial notification, while two h ad given no notification at all (see Annex 2).  
 
There is therefore an obvious problem in timing, and alongside this there are also fears concerning 
Member States ’ ability to transpose EU law into national legislation correctly and accurately; 
verification of this point must focus on the work done in level 3. 
 
TABLE 2: DIRECTIVES ADOPTED UNDER THE LAMFALUSSY PROCESS 
Directive 
Date of 
presentation  Agreement Time Time for level 2 
Dead line for 
implementation Total time 
Market Abuse 30 may 2001 28 january 2003 20 months  18 months  12 October 2004 41 months  
Prospectus  
30 May 2001, 
amended on 
9 August 2002 
4 November 2003 15 months  18 months  1 July 2005 35 months  
Market in Financial 
Instruments  (MiFID) 
19 November 
2002 21 April 2004 18 months  24 months  
30 April 2006 
 -- 
Transparency  26 March 2003 12 May 2004 political agreement  14 months  -- -- -- 
SOURCE: our elaboration on  Inter-Institutional Monitoring Group, 2004, Third Report Monitoring the Lamfalussy 
Process, Brussels, November. 
 
 
The second point of interest regards the effectiveness of the work done in the first two levels. The 
main critical factor appears to be the division of labour between the first level, responsible for 
defining the basic principles, and the second level, where the technical details of norms are 
thrashed out. It is not always easy to distinguish between these two areas, and thus there is a risk 
that technical factors will be discussed at level 1: from the first years of application of the process it 
emerges that the opinions of the various members of the European Parliament, and the market 
participants, may vary considerably with regard to what is  a principle and what is a technical 
aspect.  
 
Experience has shown that the degree of detail introduced in level 1 of a Directive, and thus the 
borderline between basic principles and technical rules, is determined by the political joint decision-
making process. It is therefore more a political than a legal matter, settled by negotiations between 
the Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament31. The level of detail 
included in level 1 increases for very controversial topics, on which there has been constant 
pressure from various national interest groups, with the result that the primary legislation has 
contained technical aspects which should have been left to level 2. 
 
There are two possible consequences: firstly, the entire structure of the Lamfalussy process may 
be put in jeopardy, while secondly, excessive detail at level 1 conflicts with the aim of achieving 
speed and flexibility in the legislative process, because any subsequent amendments become 
lengthy, problematical affairs, depending on the time-consuming political joint decision-making 
process, rather than the work of the Committees. 
                                                     
30
 See Inter-Institutional Monitoring Group, 2004, Third Report Monitoring the Lamfalussy Process , Brussels, November.   
31
 See FERRARINI G., 2005, CONTRACT STANDARDS AND THE MARKETS IN FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS DIRECTIVE MIFID. AN 
ASSESSMENT OF THE LAMFALUSSY REGULATORY ARCHITECTURE, ERCL  1. 
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The debate has involved both academics and market participants.  According to some32, the fact 
that it has not proved possible to prevent the discussion of technical aspects in level 1 is simply a 
political fact of life, and although it contradicts the basic approach of the entire process, it should 
decrease with time; in any case, the system is considered sufficiently robust to withstand a certain 
amount of rule-breaking in the allocation of legislative questions. Others 33 affirm that the system 
has gone too far in inserting excessive details in level 1, because as a consequence the first two 
levels end up regulating factors which should be assigned to the third. Those in this camp cite the 
case of the MiFID, in which they claim there was a substantial re -regulation of the rules of conduct 
for securities firms, with negative effects on private autonomy, giving the system forms of rigidity in 
obvious conflict with the original spirit of the Lamfalussy process. The problem, they state, derives 
not so much from the new regulatory framework, as from the European institutions' unwillingness 
to delegate powers to the levels downstream of level 1. 
 
Market participants express a fear of over-regulation in general, especially at level 1, which they 
state should be avoided in favour of flexibility, trusting in the market's capability for self-regulation. 
They therefore generally point to the need to strike a care ful balance when selecting the aspects to 
be assigned to the first three levels, giving due consideration to the different status and authority of 
the players involved. 
 
In the final analysis, on the basis of events so far, an improvement in the distinction between the 
different roles and tasks of levels 1 and 2 is one of the most urgent problems if the aim is to 
achieve a flexible, coherent set of regulations for the securities sector also capable of facilitating 
cross-border transactions. It is therefore necessary for level 1 to deal strictly with guiding principles 
only, leaving greater scope for the subjects discussed at level 234. 
 
Another problematical aspect of the work done so far is that, with the aim of speeding up the 
CESR's proceedings in level 2, in some cases proceedings have been conducted simultaneously, 
with the mandate conferred on the CESR before the completion of level 1. Conducting the first two 
levels simultaneously rather than consecutively has allowed the CESR 's consultations with market 
participants to take place more quickly, while also making more time available for this operation. 
However, this methodology may mean that the approaches adopted at level 2 influence the 
decisions to be taken at the first level.  Basically, there is a risk of blurring the distinction between 
the policy and technical levels, giving the latter inappropriate influence over the former.  
 
One suggestion to emerge from consultations with market participants is that work should only be 
conducted simultaneously on those points of principle for which the level 1 policy decision has 
already been taken. 
 
The market participants' comments on their direct involvement in this initial period of operation of 
the Lamfalussy process are also worthy of further consideration. While in general the participants 
are in favour of the Comitology approach, there is no lack of criticism of various aspects of the 
work done so far, especially the fact that Directives are still  too complex. It also emerges that in 
general the role played by market forces is seen as insufficient and ineffective.  
 
Firstly, the market participants' own direct involvement in the level 2 consultations is often judged 
to be insufficient, as is their contribution to the drafting of the rules. One commentator even 
claimed that market participants should be assigned the task of judging the regulation's impact and 
deciding the speed with which changes should be introduced. 
 
                                                     
32
 See  FERRAN E., 2004,  BUILDING AN EU SECURITIES MARKET, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS (CIT . IN FERRARINI ). 
33
 See FERRARINI G., 2005, CONTRACT STANDARDS AND THE MARKETS IN FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS DIRECTIVE MIFID. AN 
ASSESSMENT OF THE LAMFALUSSY REGULATORY ARCHITECTURE, European Review of Contract Law, 1/2005 
34
 See ECB, 2004, THE INTEGRATION OF THE SINGLE MARKET FOR FINACIAL SERVICES: THE EUROSYSTEM PERSPECTIVE, KEYNOTE 
SPEECH BY JEAN-CLAUDE TRICHET, PARIS, 6 DECEMBER; REVIEW OF THE APPLICA TION OF THE LAMFALUSSY FRAMEWORK TO EU 
SECURITIES MARKET LEGISLATION, 17 FEBRUARY 2005.  
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Participants also highlight a lack of attention to the new rules' impact on them, especiall y in terms 
of the costs of compliance. Moreover, consultation times are often considered to be too short, with 
a failure to agree them with participants. One common comment was that too much emphasis has 
often been placed on the speed of the legislative process, at the expense of the quality of the 
regulations produced. Therefore for the future, in the "post-FSAP" period we will be discussing in 
greater detail in our conclusions, there is a demand for more attention to quality, especially since 
the planned regulatory system is now virtually complete and the focus will shift to its 
implementation. 
 
 
4.2 Levels 3 and 4 
 
Level 3 concerns Member States' implementation of the legislation produced in the first two levels.  
Its importance is clear, since the success of the Lamfalussy process is strongly dependent on the 
rapid, accurate, coherent transposition of EU legislation into national law.  Otherwise, there may be 
a failure to a create a level playing field, with obvious negative knock-on effects for the construction 
of the single market35. 
 
The Committee most active at level 3 is currently the CESR36, engaged on the Market Abuse 
Directive and the Prospectus Directive. And it is from the CESR 's documents themselves that we 
can trace the lines along which this Committee is working to ensure uniform implementation of 
securities sector regulations and the critical points encountered37: 
 
1. the coordinated implementation of EU legislation in the Member States, with regard to both 
the incorporation of Directives into national law and rules for their application on a day to 
day basis. The main problem here appears to be that the various national bodies do not 
have the same powers. All modifications in this area have to be made by national 
governments; 
 
2. regulatory convergence, with the production of shared approaches and standards to 
facilitate harmonised implementation, through the issue of guidelines, recommendations 
and standards, which however do not have the status of EU law. They are only adopted by 
the supervisory authorities on a voluntary basis; 
 
3. convergence in the performance of supervisory activities and the fulfilment of the tasks 
assigned by European regulations. Above all, this objective requires cooperation and the 
efficient exchange of information between the various national authorities. The Monitoring 
Group goes further, encouraging the CESR to act as mediator in case of disagreement 
between the authorities of different states. There is the possibility of failure to reach an 
agreement, on specific topics linked to the principle of mutual recognition, between the 
authorities of the country of origin and the host country; such cases might be resolved by 
mediation between equals, i.e. the CESR members. In addition, it may suggest an 
expansion of the context of joint interventions, such as inspections and investigations for 
market participants working cross-border, training activities, and the establishment of 
databases, enabling the national supervisory authorities to make joint interpretations and 
decisions and perhaps  generating a body of EU jurisprudence in the future. 
  
                                                     
35
 See  INTER-INSTITUTIONAL MONITORING GROUP, THIRD REPORT MONITORING THE LAMFALUSSY PROCESS, BRUSSELS, 17 
NOVEMBER 2004. 
36
 THE CEBS  AND CEIOPS  HAVE ALSO STARTED TO FUNCTION, BUT STILL IN A VERY LIMITED WAY.  THE CEBS IS WORKING TO 
ACHIEVE THE COHERENT  IMPLEMENTATION OF BASEL 2; SEE. ECB, 2004, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR FINAN CIAL 
REGULATION, SUPERVISION AND STA BILITY , MONTHLY BULLETIN, NOVEMBER. 
37
 SEE THE COMMITTEE OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES REGULATORS, 2004, THE ROLE OF CESR AT “LEVEL 3” UNDER THE 
LAMFALUSSY PROCESS, ACTION PLAN FOR 2005 , PARIS, OCTOBER, ALSO SEE INTER-INSTITUTIONAL MONITORING GROUP, 2004, 
THIRD REPORT MONITORING THE LAMFALUSSY PROCESS, BRUSSELS, 17 NOVEMBER. 
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The CESR has also made considerable efforts during this initial period to achieve a better 
definition of its context of operation. These lines of discussion have generated a fertile debate on 
the possible development of the role of the CESR as European supervisory authority, a point to be 
covered in our concluding section. 
 
As already stated, it will not be possible to make an assessment of the flexibility and coherence of 
level 4 until most of the FSAP measures have been implemented in the individual states and it is 
possible to test their coherence. However, it is clear that the development of level 4 depends to a 
large extent on the evolution which takes place in level 3. 
 
 
5 The Supervisory Structure in Europe 
 
The approach to financial supervision in Europe is another major factor in the construction of the 
single market. Financial integration is facilitated by the regulatory framework defined by the FSAP, 
and by the single currency for 12 states, but another essential precondition is a high degree of 
convergence, if not actual standardisation, of the supervisory function, still in the hands of national 
governments. 
 
The definition of the FSAP, a body of regulations with extremely broad scope, was one necessary 
step towards integration: the legislative stage alone took five years to complete, and will probably 
require further measures, as already mentioned, but this in itself is not enough. 
 
The problem which now arises is that of the implementation of the European legislation in the 
Member States, and we have already seen the failure of the time-scale to come up to expectations 
in the first "test" case, that of the Market Abuse Directive. Another problem concerns the 
procedures by which European regulations are transposed into national legislation and the quality 
of the implementation process. The fear is that differences may emerge between the way in which 
market participants are treated by the supervisory bodies in the various states, with obvious 
negative repercussions in terms of fair competition and effective financial integration, if operators 
should be impeded from obtaining uniform access to markets, or in case of discrimination on the 
basis of country of origin. 
 
This fear derives from the fact that within the Union of 25, while cross-border business is growing 
and the compartmentalisation of the financial services industry is being reduced, there are a range 
of profoundly different regulatory and supervisory models.  The European Union is home to  no less 
than 60 bodies responsible for supervising markets and intermediaries, with widely varying 
institutional nature, powers and areas of jurisdiction, while some states have a single authority and 
others several operating simultaneously38. 
 
This may hinder the completion of the single market, because the fragmentation of the supervisory 
bodies and areas of jurisdiction increases the cost of regulation and may generate uncertainty 
amongst market participants, discouraging the development of cross-border operations.  Secondly, 
it may prove ineffective in preventing systemic risk, as the ever-increasing interconnections at the 
cross-border level may tend to amplify crises occurring on specific markets, with obvious 
repercussions on investor safeguards 39. 
 
The Lamfalussy process has begun to change the structure of supervision in Europe from the 
status quo of the late Nineties by introducing the Supervisory Committees which operate, at level 
                                                     
38
 See  CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN REFORM,  2004, OVER BUT FAR FROM FIN ISHED, THE EU’S FSAP, SEPTEMBER; VARIOUS AUTHORS,  
2004, REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS . A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE, PAPER PRESENTED 
AT EFMA  ANNUAL MEETING, BASEL, MIMEO, JUNE, PAGE 7. THE SURVEY COVERS EU 25. 
39
 See  ECB, 2004, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR FINAN CIAL REGULATION, SUPERVISION AND STA BILITY , MONTHLY 
BULLETIN, NOVEMBER  
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three, with the aim of achieving regulatory and supervisory convergence.  However, it must be 
remembered that this is a minimal objective, in a situation still based on supervision at the national 
level. And it is from this state of affairs, and an initial assessment of the first Supervisory 
Committee to become operational, the CESR, that we can begin to sound out the feasibility of 
further steps forward, analysing the options for the securities sector emerging from the ongoing 
debate involving the European Commission, academics, the CESR itself, the ECB and market 
participants. 
 
At one extreme of the range of hypotheses put forward lies the maximum degree of uniformity, to 
be achieved through the creation, at the EU level, of a single authority or even a number of 
authorities with jurisdiction over the various sectors of the financial services industry. The other 
extreme envisages better coordination between the national supervisory authorities, above all for 
intermediaries engaging in cross-border operations.  Between these two extremes there are a 
range of alternative options, assigning a growing level of importance to the Committees 
themselves40. 
 
When assessing the various proposals, it must be remembered that the problem of the regulatory 
approach appears to be political rather than theoretical and is by no means easy to s olve.  Events 
have shown that European financial integration is not always the top priority of national 
governments, as in spite of public statements and affirmations of principle, they often opt for the 
defence of national interests, meaning those of thei r own intermediaries and markets 41. We need 
only consider the well-known contrast between the British and continental regulatory models.  
British financial market participants claim that they would be placed at a competitive disadvantage 
by the creation of a regulatory authority based on the continental approach, while  the continental 
states tend to fear that a body operating on the British principles would work to the advantage of 
London as a financial centre. 
 
Since, as things now stand, the debate on the structure of controls in Europe is mainly inspired by 
the activities undertaken for the regulation of the securities industry, it is useful to base these brief 
comments on contributions made by the CESR itself, especially the so-called Himalaya Report.42 
According to the CESR, the Committee's current structure might evolve by adapting the 
supervisory instruments already envisaged to provide an appropriate response to changes in the 
markets, i.e. without the creation of new bodies.  The conditions required for this to come about 
depend basically on two factors: the status and powers both of the national authorities which make 
up the CESR and of the CESR itself. 
 
With regard to the first aspect, it should be remembered that the Directives introduced as part of 
the FSAP place heavy additional obligations on the national authorities with regard to cooperation. 
They therefore have to be provided with equivalent powers and resources to enable them to 
operate uniformly and rule out the risk of regulatory arbitrage. Reference is made to  the power to 
supervise, investigate and impose penalties, and to exchange information, all in relation to the 
subject which is the target of supervision.  These aspects are fundamental for the functioning of the 
relations between the authorities in the financial intermediary's country of origin and those of the 
host country, since the principle of mutual recognition might become ineffective as cross -border 
activities expand. National authorities might therefore receive additional legal  powers to allow them 
to work together, overcoming a problem of accountability which arises in level 3. The responsibility 
for making the necessary changes in this area lies with the individual Member States. 
 
With regard to the second aspect, the legal bases for the functioning of the CESR, and the other 
supervisory committees, are weak: they set rules, but without any legal and institutional mandate to 
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 ON THIS DEBATE, SEE IN PARTICULAR: BREUER R-E., FERRARINI G., CALZOLARI M., FREIAX X., HARTMAN P., MAYER C., TRICHET 
J.C.. 
41
 See. BREUER ROLF-E, 2004, THE FUTURE OF EU FINANCIAL MARKET INTEGRATION: A POST-FSAP AGENDA, SUERF 11° 
ANNUAL LECTURE 25 NOVEMBER, A MSTERDAM. 
42
 See  THE COMMITTEE OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES REGULATORS, 2004,  PRELIMINARY PROGRESS REPORT. WHICH SUPERVISORY  
TOOLS FOR THE EU SECURITIES MARKET? AN ANALYTICAL PAPER BY CESR, PARIS, OCTOBER. 
 19 
do so, meaning that they function as a network on a mainly voluntary basis. This generates a 
further problem of accountability. The priority proposed is to expand the cooperation agreements 
within the regulatory framework established by the FSAP, in order to reinforce the relationships 
between the various states' authorities and improve the convergence of supervisory and decision-
making approaches.  
 
Finally, the CESR foresees a development of its role, still within regulatory restrictions, as  
“supervisor of national supervisors”, meaning that it would formally be assigned additional 
supervisory powers.  This option points to a role for the CESR very different from that envisaged by 
the Lamfalussy Committee, and has received a very mixed response, especially from market 
participants. On the one hand, they agree on the need for a stronger role, but only for th e CESR as 
advisor to the national authorities and a centre for the exchange of information, envisaging a 
system of mediation between national authorities, as also suggested by the Inter Institutional 
Monitoring Group .43 On the other hand, as things now stand there is no consensus on the 
suggestion that the CESR should be awarded powers which allow it to exercise functions of 
governance over the individual national supervisory authorities, for which there is however no 
formal mandate. The role of the CESR is therefore seen as that of a network of evolving 
supervisory authorities: on this head the Fédération Bancarie Européenne (FBE) refers to a role as 
“coordinator of supervisors”, rather than as “supervisor of supervisors”44. 
 
A gradual but sweeping proposal for an effective, efficient supervisory function at the European 
level is put forward in the May 2005 European Commission Green Paper, which outlines an 
approach structured in three stages for the period 2005-201045. The aim is that of effective 
regulation and supervision, which guarantees financial stability while minimising the costs of 
regulation for systems, intermediaries and markets . The “three-step evolutionary approach” has 
been largely supported by market participants in the consultation phase; the subsequent White 
Paper does  not really add to the analysis in the Green Paper and its Annex 1, while reaffirming that 
convergence of supervisory practices is seen by the Commission as a key task in the next 5 
years.46 
 
1. The first stage concerns agreement on policy objectives overall: the further development of 
competition, in order to continue along the path marked out by the Lisbon Agenda and in 
the maintenance of financial stability.  
2. The second stage requires the continuation and improvement of the Lamfalus sy process, 
identifying the weak or missing points and developing the existing instruments. Special 
attention is paid to the avoidance of overlaps or conflicts in case of cross -border operations. 
Since the principle of home country control is to be retaine d, it becomes necessary to clarify 
and strengthen the roles and responsibilities of the national supervisory bodies by working 
on the convergence of supervisory practices, in compliance with the existing European 
legislation. 
3. The last phase, or we might say the last solution, envisages that, if the existing system 
clearly proves incapable of moving towards supervisory convergence, there will be a shift to 
the creation of new supervisory structures.   
 
Various commentators identify supervision for cross-border activities as a critical factor, since it is 
here that the principle of home country control may prove ineffective. In this area, the creation of a 
lead supervisor may overcome the problems of duplication of controls, but it is definitely no solution 
to the problem of nationally based supervision in relation to the attempt to establish a truly 
integrated, stable financial market. One suggestion is for two supervisory levels, with only small 
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intermediaries working at the domestic level still subject to th e supervision of the national 
authorities.  For intermediaries working at the pan -European level, this proposal envisages the 
creation of a European System of Financial Supervision, similar to the ESCB for monetary policy, 
which would act as supreme authority for the interpretation and implementation of regulations in 
case of  conflicts between national authorities 47. 
 
In the final analysis, it is obvious that the single market requires not only a single regulatory 
framework, but also a single supervisory system. How to achieve this, and what structure to give it, 
are problems it is not easy to solve, involving the various stakeholders, all called upon to play an 
interactive role. 
 
First and foremost, the policy makers: on the one hand national governments, reluctant to 
surrender their sovereignty and subject to pressure from the market participants, and on the other 
hand the framers of European policy, who end up negotiating compromises between the various 
national demands.   
 
Secondly, the CESR, and in the future the other Committees, which seems to have difficulty in 
functioning due to the influence and pressure brought to bear by the other players in the integration 
process. The Committee process underway is by no means perfect, but the time does not appear 
ripe for a leap forward to a more independent, authoritative role.  If the Committees' work were to 
prove successful, this would leave room for market forces to determine the supervisory and 
regulatory approach. Otherwise, at an unspecified time in the fu ture, we might be faced with a 
centralised solution, with a single regulatory and supervisory authority at the European level48. 
 
The market participants represent another interest group.  Its proposals are sometimes incoherent, 
because they reflect national models which differ in terms of operating practices and supervisory 
models, with a varying degree of willingness to proceed rapidly along the path towards integration.  
 
Last but not least, it is important not to overlook the ECB's interest in the evolution of a supervisory 
function at a European level, to safeguard financial stability and the proper operation of the 
mechanisms for the transmission of monetary policy.  
  
In our view, the time is not yet ripe for a pan European solution, which might be the most effective 
in operational terms from the theoretical point of view, but for which there is no legal basis. We are 
faced with a political and cultural problem, which might be solved most easily by a step -by-step 
approach founded on a broad consensus, concentrating on the evolution of the role of the 
Committees, fully exploiting the potential of the Lamfalussy process and allowing market forces to 
make their contribution to the emergence of a European supervisory model. The limitations of this 
solution are however clear: first and foremost, the times needed to complete a step -by-step 
approach and the difficulty in achieving progress by this method.  
 
It must be remembered that the fast-evolving financial markets often place a premium on quick, 
flexible responses. While on the one hand the European supervisory structure should evolve along 
the lines outlined to assist in the completion of the single market, on the other hand the very 
process of integration itself may generate the most pressing, convincing arguments for supervision 
in line with its evolution. 
 
                                                     
47
 See  BREUER ROLF-E, 2004,  THE FUTURE OF EU FINANCIAL MARKET INTEGRATION: A POST-FSAP AGENDA, SUERF 11° ANNUAL 
LECTURE 25 NOVEMBER, A MSTERDA M 
48
 See  FREIAX X., HARTMAN P., MAYER C., 2004, THE ASSESSMENT: EUROPEAN FINANCIAL INTEGRATION, IN OXFORD REVIEW OF 
ECONOMIC POLICY, VOL. 20. NO. 4  
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Source: European Commission, White Paper on Financial Policy 2005-2010, Brusseles, 5 December, 2005  
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Annex 2. Lamfalussy League Table – Transposition of Lamfalussy 
Directives – State of play 15/03/2006. 
 
 
 
The European Commission has published a “Lamfalussy league table” on Member States’ success 
in meeting deadlines for writing into national law a series of securities Directives that were adopted 
as part of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) launched in 1999  
Internal Market and Services Commissioner Charlie McCreevy said: “Over the last six years we 
have made great strides towards a more open, integrated and competitive European financial 
market. However, some Member States are still lagging behind on the securities Directives. This is 
frankly very disappointing, bordering on the lamentable. This is going to hamper the efficiency of 
Europe’s capital markets and the vital ‘single passport for issuers’. I hope this league table will 
encourage these Member States to act quickly and I strongly urge them to do so. We will continue 
to monitor the situation like hawks.” 
At this stage, March 2006, the league table covers the Market Abuse Directive (2003/6/EC) and its 
three technical implementing Directives (2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC), the 
Prospectus Directive (2003/71/EC) , the Market in Financial Instruments Directive (“MiFID”, 
2004/39/EC) and the Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC) as well as their implementing 
measures. 
SOURCE: http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/docs/transposition/table_en.pdf 
 
 
 26 
Bibliography 
 
Breuer Rolf-E, 2004, The Future of EU Financial Market Integration: a Post-FSAP Agenda, Suerf 11° Annual Lecture 25 
November, Amsterdam. 
 
Calzolari Michele, 2004, Normative europee e controlli sull’attività degli intermediari  finanziari , Convegno “Banche e 
mercato: fra regole e nuove opportunità”, Avellino, 15 -16 Ottobre. 
 
Centre for European Reform, 2004, Over but far from finished, the EU’s FSAP , September 
 
CESR, The Committee of European Securities Regulators, 2003, The Role of CESR in the Regulation and Supervision 
of UCITS and Asset Management Activities in the EU, Consultation Paper, CESR/03-378b, Paris, October.  
 
CESR, The Committee of European Securities Regulators, 2004, The Role of CESR at “Level 3” under the Lamfalussy 
Process, Action Plan for 2005, Paris, October.  
 
CESR, The Committee of European Securities Regulators, 2004, Preliminary progress report Which supervisory tools for 
the EU securities market? An Analytical paper by CESR, Paris, October.  
 
Committee of Wise Men, 2000, The initial Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European 
Securities Markets, Brussels, November.  
 
Committee of Wise Men, 2001, The Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European 
Securities Markets, Brussels, February. 
 
Economic and Financial Committee, 2000, EFC Sound EU supervisory structures and practices (“Brouwer I report”), 
Brussels, January.  
 
Economic and Financial Committee, 2001, EFC Report on financial crisis management (“Brouwer II report”), Brussels, 
April. 
 
ECB, 2003, The integration of Europe’s financial markets, Monthly Bulletin, October.  
 
ECB, 2004, Developments in the EU framework for financial regulation, supervision and stability, Monthly Bulletin, 
November. 
 
ECB, 2004, The integrat ion of the single market for financial services: the Eurosystem perspective , Keynote speech by 
Jean-Claude Trichet, Paris, December.  
 
European Commission, Financial Services, 1998 – 2004, Progress reports, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/finances/actionplan/.  
 
European Commission, 2003, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council 
Directive 73/239/EEC, 85/611/EEC, 91/675/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 94/19/EEC and Directives 2000/12/EC, 2002/83/EC and 
2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, in order to establish a new financial services committee 
organisational structure, COM (2003) 659 final, Brussels, 5.11.2003. 
 
European Commission, 2005, Green Paper on Financial Services Policy (2005-2010), Brussels, 3 May  
 
European Commission, 2005, Green Paper Annex, Transposition of FSAP Directives, July. 
 
European Commission, 2005, White Paper on Financial Services Policy (2005-2010), Brussels, 5 December 
 
European Commission, 2005 Communicati on from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Second Implementation Report of the 
Internal Market Strategy 2003-2006. Brussels, January. 
 
European Commission, 2005, Internal Market, Deficit of transposition, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/docs/transposition/table_en.pdf. 
 
Fédération Bancarie Européenne (FBE), 2005 Response to CESR’s Preliminary Progress Report: “Which Supervisory 
Tools for the Eu Securities Markets? An Analytical Paper by CESR”, October 2004. 
 
FEFSI, 2002, Extension of the Lamfalussy Procedure . Statement on EFC Re port on Financial Regulation, Supervision 
and Stability, 02-4024, November.  
 
Ferran E., 2004, Building an EU Securities Market, Cambridge University Press.  
 27 
 
Ferrarini G., 2005 Contract Standards and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive MiFID. An assessment of the 
Lamfalussy Regulatory Architecture , European Review of Contract Law, 1/2005). 
 
Freiax X., Hartman P., Mayer C., 2004, The assessment: European financial integration, in Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, Vol. 20. no. 4.  
 
Grasso A. G., Gualandri E., Venturelli V., 2004, Financial Services Action and Comitology Approach: Implication for the 
Regulation of the Asset Management Industry in the EU, Materiali di discussione, n. 104, Dipartimento di Economia 
Aziendale dell’Università degli Studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia. 
 
Grasso A. G., Gualandri E., 2005, Verso un nuovo assetto regolamentare e di vigilanza nell’UE: Post-Fsap e 
Comitatologia, in G. N. Mazzocco (Editor), Asset management: prospettive di convergenza tra banche e assicurazioni. 
Profili  regolamentari e gestionali , Giappichelli, Torino 
 
Kok Group, The High Level Group, 2004, Facing the challenge, the Lisbon strategy for growth and employment.  
 
Inter-Insti tutional Monitoring Group, 2004, Third Report Monitoring the Lamfalussy Process, Brussels, November. 
 
Lannoo K., Levin M., 2004, Securities Market Regulation in the EU, Ceps Research Report in Finance and Banking, 
N.33, May..  
 
Lastra R.M., 2003, The Governance Structure for Financial Regulation and supervision in Europe, FMG Special Paper 
no. 149. 
 
Levine R., 2001, “International Financial Liberalization and Economic Growth,” Review of International Economic, 9, 688-
702. 
 
McCreevy C., 2005, Recent Developments in the Internal Market and for Financial Services and Financial Reporting, 
European Commission for Internal Market and Services, Speech/05/778, Brussels, 8 December  
 
McCreevy C., 2006, The next steps of financial Europe, Commission for Internal Market and Services, Speech/06, 
Brussels, 9 March  
 
McCreevy C., 2006, Financial Market Integration, Commission for Internal Market and Services, Speech/06, Brussels, 9 
March  
 
Spaventa L., 2004, European Financial Integration: Nuts and Bolts, in Monetary Union in Europe – Historical 
perspectives and prospects for the future. Essays in honour of Niels Thygesen. 
 
Sutton A.(Chairman), Lannoo K. & Casey J.-P. (Rapporteurs) , 2005, EU Financial Regulation & Supervision beyond 
2005, Ceps Task Force Report N.54, January 
 
Various Authors, 2004, Regulation and Supervision of Financial Institutions and Ma rkets. A European Perspective, Paper 
presented at EFMA Annual Meeting, Basel, mimeo, June.  
 
Venturelli V.,2005, Profili Regolamentari del Comparto dell'Asset Management, in G. N. Mazzocco (Editor) Asset 
management: prospettive di convergenza tra banche e assicurazioni. Profili regolamentari e gestionali , Giappichelli, 
Torino . 
 
 
